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Thestabilization of German currency tore aside
the dense veil of paper marks that had obscured the
Various business journals, monographs and official reports constitute
the source for the materials presented in Part A. Particularly suggestive
were Reports of the Agent General for Reparation Payments, 1925—30
(Berlin,1925—30); James W. Angell, The Recovery of Germany; Institut
für Konjunkturforschung, Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung,
\'ols. '—7 (Reimar Hobbing, Berlin, 1926—32); Fritz Naphtaii, Abbau
und Aufbau: Rückblick auf das Wirtschaftsjahr 1925 So-
cietats-Druckerei, Frankfurt a.M., 1926); Reichskreditgesellschaft, A-G.,
Germany's Economic Development, semi-annual analyses, 1926—32 (Ber-
lin, 1926—32); C. L. Roedler, Grundzuge der deutschen K,onjunhturbeweg-
ung, 1920—25(Frankfurta.M., 1926); Erich Welter, Wachstum: Die
deutsche Wirtschaft im Jahre 1927; and Stockung: Die Wirt-
schaft im Jahre 1929(FrankfurterSocietäts-Druckerei, Frankfurt a.M.,
1928 and 1930); also Dreifache Krise....(Societäts-Verlag,Frankfurt
a.M., 1931).
25]features of German economy. With the return to
an effective standard of money measurement, itis
possible to see more clearly the variety of factors
influencing that economy, no longer dominated by
the phenomena of inflation.
a. Post-stabilization Depression
The period immediately following the currency
reform was characterized by deep depression in
most aspects of economic activity. Scarcity of money
and credit, lethargy in production and'trade, reduc-
tion of government and business staffs—reflected in
sharp wage conflicts—were tokens of the economic
difficulties.
An extraordinary lack of ready money intensified
the need for credit. Interest rates were very high.
The Reichsbank discount rate, which stood at io
per cent in January 1924,wasfar below the market
rates.2 The central bank, therefore, sought to pre-
vent a rush of credit seekers by the introduction of
a rationing system.
After the return to the gold basis of reckoning, a
decline in commodity prices was apparent. An even
greater decline in prices was probably retarded by
the slow abandonment of price-calculating methods
and risk charges that had been prevalent during
the period of inflation. The few available statistics
of industrial production in the last months of 1923
The average rate in January for day-to.day money was87.64per cent
per year.
[26indicate that it was low. The number of unemployed
receiving public assistance—which rose from 139,000
on August 1, 1923 to 1,533,000 Ofl January i, 1924
—convey some impression of the extent of the
dine.3
With the development of depression an inclina-
tion to clear away the debris that had accumulated
during the inflation became apparent. Many Gov-
ernment officials and employees were dismissed. At
the .same time, private business was obliged to resort
to wholesale reductions of staff. Everywhere in the
clear dawn after the nightmare of inflation there
was a calculation of incomes and costs. It was a
calculation that generally led first to a scaling-down
of costs by means of payroll reductions. Later it was
to lead to technical 'rationalization'.
b. Halting Revival
The depression that began with the stabilization
of the mark was pronounced in all aspects of Ger-
man economy until January 1924. A scarcity of loan
capital, declining prices,businessinactivity, and
growing unemployment wereitschief features.
Symptoms of recovery were apparent from February
to May. But there were also definite symptoms of
depression during this period—tightness of credit,
difficulties in the settlement of accounts, decline of
security prices, a great increase in business failures
and a general lack of business confidence.
aStatistischesReichsamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik,, Vol. 4, passim.
27]The relatively generous creditpolicy of the
Reichsbank at this time was probably an important
factor in the impulse to recovery. The low discount
rate of the central bank ('low' relative to market
rates) and its moderate rationing system made for a
rapidly broadening flow of credit.4 No doubt the
Reichsbank was desirous of doing all it could to pull
business out of the stabilization depression, but in the
process it engendered a minor credit inflation. Its ac-
count for discounted bills rose from Rm. 39,500,000
on November 15,1923toRm.1,867,000,000 on April
7, 1924. About Rm. i,ooo,ooo,ooo of this increase
occurred during February and March. For a mOment
there was danger of seriously threatening the re-
cently achieved monetary stability. It was decided,
on April 7, to hold to a rigorous policy of credit
restriction by means of rationing advances. The
directory of the Reichsbank ordered that the maxi-
mum limit of credit extensions be the amount al-
ready extended on April7.
Indicative of the tightness of credit were the rates
for monthly money, which rose rapidly in February
and had almost doubled by the beginning of May.
During most of this period there was a downward
movement in the price level of stocks. The general
decline in commodity prices that ceased in February
was followed by an upturn lasting until the end of
In the period February—May 1924,theaverage Reichsbank discount
rate was io per cent; the average rate for monthly money was per
cent.
[28April—that is, until shortly after the restriction of
credits by the Reich. Industrial production in gen-
eral increased during the first months of 1924.There
is also sign of more active business in the rising
number of freight cars placed at the disposal of
shippers and in the figures for Reichsbank clearings.
The industries catering to domestic consumption
were enlivened by the upswing of business, and, as
a consequence, imports of raw materials rose con-
siderably. Exports, however, did not keep pace with
imports. Statistics of the labor market give further
indication of growing business activity. For the first
time since August 1923adecline in unemployment
was apparent. But reviving domestic activity did not
mitigate business difficulties; on the contrary, the
number of business failures increased steadily.
Thus the business revival during the early part of
1924wasa tempering of the depression that imme-
diately followed currency stabilization. It was prob-
ably engendered by an expansion of credit that
continued until bridled by the Reichsbank in April.
The credit demands ofprivatebusiness were
whetted by the discount policy of the central bank.
The result was a mild recurrence of inflation—this
time in bank credit rather than in paper marks.
Brisker demand, especially for consumers' goods,
set in. Prices rose, unemployment sank. But the
stimulus was brief. Events during the middle of the
year showed that it was something of a surface swell
29]that for a time stimulated the industries catering to
domestic consumption.
After the restrictive policy of the Reichsbank had
become effective, and the expansion of the purchas-
ing power had ceased, there was little doubt that
German economy was still depressed. During the
summer of 1924 characteristics of depression were
apparent:weakened consumer demand,falling
prices, increasing business failures, reduced imports,
growing unemployment and curtailed production.
A significant manifestation of depression at this
time was an extensive reduction of the business ma-
chinery, a general retrenchment, which was par-
ticularly markedin banking and commercial organi-
zations.It was reflected in growing numbers of
unemployed. Also symptomatic for this period was
the relation between theestablishment and the
liquidation of business enterprises.. In thefirst
months of 1924 many new firms were founded, but
in the 'summer there was a large increase in the
number of liquidations.
A favorable symptom among many unfavorable
ones during the mid-summer of 1924 was a fairly
steady drop in money rates. Somewhat easier credit
conditions were reflected not only in a decline of
interest ,rates but also in a general tendency to ex-
tend credits over longer periods. Easier money rates,
together with a supporting action by the larger Ber-
un banks, made for a slight recovery of the .stock
market.
[30c. Definite Recovery
Not until the middle of August, however, were
there clear indications of improvement in business
conditions. Probably an important influence in the
direction of economic recovery was the promulga-
tion of the Dawes Plan although "it simply served
to set up the preliminary conditions—removal of the
Allied pressure, stabilization of the national finances
and currency, and the restoration of general confi-
dence—which were necessary to make recovery pos-
sible."
Among the first results of the Plan were the new
Reichsbank and currency laws—expressions of the
complete adoption of the Reichsmark currency—
and the successful flotation of the German External
Loan of 1924,amountingto 8oo million marks. This
loan was of especial importance not only because it
was accompanied by a moratorium from reparation
payments during the first year of the new Plan but
also because it enormously strengthened the con-
fidénce of the outside world in the German economy.
Foreign capital now began to enter the country in
the form of private credits or of direct purchases of
interest in German business concerns.
The growing inflow of foreign funds gave con-
siderable relief. It made possible the resumption of
projects that had been abandoned because of lack
Angell, op. cit., p. 77. The Dawes Plan was submitted by the First Com-
mittee of Experts on April g, 1924.ThePlan was approved by the
responsible powers on August i6 and went into effect on September z,
1924.
3'II'of capital; it restored self-confidence to business or-
ganizations. Some funds were converted into marks
for the purpose of purchasing goods within Ger-
many, thus supporting commodity prices;other
credits were at once expressed in increased imports.
With the beginning of this period of the placing of
foreign loans, the German balance of trade became
'unfavorable', and this condition prevailed until the
end of 1925.
Duringthe autumn of 1924therewere reports of
contract after contract for loans and for sales of in-
terests in business organizations. In addition, a mul-
titude of unrecorded agreements were concluded
and there were considerable sales of securities on
the stock exchange to foreign capitalists. Further-
more, the increased discounting of bills of exchange
and the acceptance of drafts by bankers in England
and the United States added considerably to German
borrowings abroad.
According to the Institut für Konjunkturfor-
schung the total of foreign loans extended to Ger-
many by the end of 1924 amounted to approximately
1200 million Reichsmarks. Loans during the first
four months of 1925 more than doubled this total.
Although short-term foreign loans were discouraged
by the Reichsbank and the financial administration,
because of the dangers that would attend their sud-
den withdrawal, a large volume was extended.
Loans whose maturity period is more than one year are called
term'; those of briefer maturity period are known as 'short-term'.
[32The business credits of the banks of issue—largely
those of the Reichsbank—expanded rapidly during
the autumn of 1924.Savingsbank deposits, almost
completely wiped out through the process of infla-
tion, again began to accumulate. Also, as was to be
expected from the large inflow of foreign funds,
some relief in the money market was evidenced in
a reduction of interest rates and in an improvement
of credit conditions, particularly in the lengthening
of the loan periods. Nevertheless, money rates re-
mained considerably above those in France, Eng-
land and the United States—testimony to the con-
tinuing scarcity of capital in Germany.
The stock exchange had, in general, been de-
pressed since the return to a stable currency. A low
price level for stocks reflected high interest rates and
unfavorable business reports. A slow advance in the
general level of stock prices began in the summer,
and continued during the autumn and winter until
February 1925.Thereafterthe course of prices was
generally downward.
Perhaps the most obvious manifestations of revival
are indexes representative of industrial production
and domestic trade. They show a fairly continuous
rise from the summer of 1924tothe end of the spring
of 1925.Butby the summer of therewere signs
of decreasing activity. Increases in the prices of in-
dustrial commodities in foreign markets and the
relatively stable German industrial price level made
for an increase in German exports. However, an
33]even greater increase in imports augmented the im-
port surplus. Unemployment was much lower in
the winter of 1924—25thanin the corresponding
season of the previous year.
The process of post-inflation business reorganiza-
lion manifested itself in continued heavy business
mortality. Probably most of the concerns then fail-
ing had been founded during the inflation period.
Practices that had been attended with success at that
time now proved dangerous. Short-time debts in-
curred during the currency inflation afforded easy
means of procuring funds, not only for purposes of
working capital but also to expand buildings and
equipment. Under later conditions of monetary
stability, however, Reichsmark loans were expensive
and had to be repaid in full gold value at frequent
intervals. It was perhaps inevitable, then, that many
business enterprises founded on a minimum of cap-
ital must now, at a time of great capital scarcity,
become dangerously embarrassed.
There is evidence, then, that by the beginning of
1925Germaneconomy had recovered, relative to
the very depressed state of the preceding winter. A
glance at the unemployment statistics for the winter
of 1924—25showsthat 'recovery' implied by no
means anything like a complete absorption of the
labor-power of the nation, and bankruptcy figures
indicate that the weeding-out process begun in the
summer of 1924wasstill in full swing.
{342. RECESSIONAND DEPRESSION, 1925—1926
ByJune 1925thefirst outriders of the impending
recession had come into view. The collapse of the
vast Stinnes concern early in that month dealt a
heavy blow to business confidence. To be sure, a
large consortium of banks intervened to prevent a
panic, but the impulse towards tighter credit condi-
tions and further declines of security prices was
given.
The downward tendency of mOney rates ceased
after April 1925.Indeed,rates began to rise, first
slightly, then more precipitately in the summer. An
increase in unemployment, a down-turn in indexes
of industrial production, increases in the amount
and number of bills protested, the growing number
of business liquidations and bankruptcies, during
June, July and August, are indications that the
course of German economy had definitely begun to
swing downward. During the autumn production
continued to decline and unemployment rose rap-
idly. Prices fell, though only moderately. Foreign
borrowings increased considerably, but, since they
were largely conversions of short-time advances,
they did not stem the recession.
It seems likely that the progressive stagnation of.
German business during the late spring and sum-
mer of 1925wasrelated to a continuing scarcity of
loan capital. Just as revival in the autumn of 1924
andthe following winter paralleled widespread
35]foreign borrowing, so the difficulties that became
more and more apparent in mid-1925 were asso-
ciated with a marked decline in the inflow of foreign
funds. Prior to the War German economy was gen-
erally in a position to satisfy independently its cap-
ital requirements. It was relatively easy to convert
short-term advances into long-term obligations by
means of stock and bond issues. But in the post.
inflation years the ability and willingness of the
domestic market to supply capital to industry was
much reduced. Thus, when foreign advances de-
clined, or amounted largely to conversions of pre-
vious loans, German borrowers were unable to turn
to supplies of domestic capital. The issue of stocks
in the face of a weakened stock market was difficult,
and the demand for bonds was so slight in 1925 as
also to make their flotation inadvisable.
Enterprises that needed credit, therefore, had to
resort to short-term borrowing. Demands for funds
overwhelmed the banks. The desire to preserve
liquidity caused them to turn down fresh demands
for money, and even to call in older loans, especially
smaller advances. Banking policy was rather more
lenient with larger debtors than with smaller. A
restriction of credit advances to the large organiza-
tions would at once have resulted in the abandon-
ment of large projects and the sudden dismissal of
many workers. Credit retrenchment, then, was made
possible by recalling medium and small loans.
In the autumn of 1925, since it was almost impos-
[36sible for industrial and commercial organizations to
consolidate debts, they had to seek short-term loans
from the credit banks. As it became more and more
apparent that repayment would be difficult, the
banks, afraid of frozen credits, pressed for settle-
ment and restricted further loans. This, of course,
made the situation all the more tense.
During the autumn and winter of 1925—26 ifl-
dustrial production—in most branches, at least—fell
considerably below the levels it had reached in the
earlier part of 1925. Raw materials and semi-manu-
factured goods constitute roughly half of Germany's
total imports, and the. greater part of the decline in
imports at this time was in this category. It is prob-
able that industrial difficulties were a determining
influence towards restricting such imports, inducing
manufacturers to rely as much as possible on ac-
cumulated stocks and more or less to limit produc-
tion. Various indexes of domestic trade, too, showed
marked declines in the autumn and winter.
One of the most serious aspects of the recession
was the great increase in unemployment during the
winter of 1925—26. Until October the number of
unemployed increased slowly, but thereafter it rose
rapidly. A growing number of business failures was
another striking reflection of the business decline
during the autumn and winter. This was probably
part of the process of slow readjustment from condi-
tions of inflation. The sudden recession may have
precipitated the eradication of many superfluous
371I-
business The majority of business or-
.ganizations failing in this period were engaged in
trading rather than in manufacturing; this indi-
cates the extent to which the inflation had stimulated
uneconomic distribution of goods. Itisdifficult,
however, to estimate the gravity of the effects upon
German economy of these many failures because the
size of the liabilities was not reported. -
Therecession, as reflected in unemployment, com-
mercial failures,, curtailed industrial production,
inactivity on the security markets and reduced vol-
ume of domestic trade, probably reached its nadir
in January and February 1926. But at that very time
signs of easier credit conditions. became apparent.
The first impulse in this direction would seem to
have come from inflowing long-term loans, mostly
from the United States. They allowed funding of
debts and considerably lightened the burden of the
banks. As hand in hand with this capital inflow the
rates for short-term loans declined, the inclination
to purchase long-time paper awakened among in-
vestors. A remarkably strong demand for mortgage
From 1914to1923,comprisingthe whole period of the war and the in-
flation, about io,ooo new stock companies and about 45,000limitedlia-
bility companies had been added to the number previously existing, and
this growth became accelerated toward the end of the period, under the
unhealthy stimulus of inflation. It was only natural that the principal
part of the failures should be among these newer concerns; during the
first ten months of 1925two-thirdsof the failures were of concerns
founded since 1919,andin the five succeeding months, which comprised
the most acute period of the crisis, 58 per cent were o such concerns.'
Report of the Agent General for Reparation Payments) June 15,1926,
p. 45-
[38bonds developed. Share. prices fell throughout the
second half of 1925,butafter the beginning of 1926
recovery was surprisingly quick, owing partly, per-
haps, to increased purchases of stocks by foreigners.
•The extreme form that the recession took—wide-
spread business failures and record unemployment
—was a manifestation of industrial reorganization
that became especially apparent 'at a time of éco-
nomic decline.8 The recession was not the reflection
of difficulties in banking; rather, it was expressed in
the withdrawal of credit from unprofitable con-
cerns, many of which had been unable to change
practices instituted during the inflation and were
still relying, for working capital, upon short-term
loans. Other concerns, representing the great ma-
jority of German business organizations, proceeded
to effect a sweeping reorganization that was not
limited to improving internal methods of adminis-
tration and production, but in the case of many of
the largest industries amounted to rebuilding the
business plant itself.9 Thus, burdens remaining from
the extent of business failures and unemployment was greater
than the decline in production is apparent in many economic reports
of the time, Of course, production did decline considerably, but not in
the same proportion as the number of employed workers. For example,
production of coal was only 5 per cent less in January 1926thanin Jan-
uary 1925,butthe number of workers was reduced 15percent. Here is
an indication of drastic reorganization, which in, this case meant the
closing of inefficient mines. Similar reorganization was taking place in
other industries. The great unemployment and heavy business mortal-
ity, therefore, must be looked upon not only as a reflection of recession
but also as an ugly aspect of 'rationalization'.(Frankfurter Zeitung,
Wirtschaftskune, 1926, I, pp. 4, 5.)
The activities of two giant enterprises—the Interessengemeinschaft
39:1the inflation were removed. Unfruitful users of
short-time credit retired from the market, while in
other quarters perfected administration admitted
the accumulation of funds for the repayment of
debt and the increase of working capital. As progress
was made in these directions, the volume of avail-
able funds increased and the cost of credit to sound
borrowers declined.
The recognition of the mistaken policies of ten
years, of the superfluity of business organizations, of
contradictory industrial plans, led to an eager will
to recast thoroughly the German productive ma-
chinery. This was the period when the shibboleth
'Rationalisierung' was shouted from every hill-top.
American methods of production, 'Fordism', 'ra-
tionalization'—these were the topics of the day.
3. RECOVERYAND PROSPERITY, 1926-1928
a. Business Consolidation During Depression
The spring of 1926wasa period of reorganization
and realignment during depression. The ranks of
the unemployed were still swollen but production
was increasing. The growing. number of railway
cars placed at the disposal of shippers, and especially
the decline in business failures and protests of bills
für Farbenindustrie and the Vereinigte Stahlwerke—at this time were
characteristic of the process that was so general. Both organizations con-
centrated their productive plants in the most suitable localities; both
introduced sweeping technical improvements; at the same time, agree-
ments were concluded with foreign producers (Ibid., June 1926,p.119).
[40of exchange indicated that, so far as business activity
was concerned, the low point had been passed.
Seasonal factors strengthened the tendency to-
wards recovery. However, the stocks of goods that
had accumulated during the recession were dimin-
ishing and production was stimulated to an activity
that was more than seasonal. An export surplus con-
tinued until June, and this, too, helped to reduce the
stock of domestic goods. Thus German economy
independently worked itself free from its previous
unliquia condition.
Although internal factors were probably respon-
sible in large measure for the revival of German pro-
duction, various influences that had their origins
abroad were of great importance in maintaining and
strengthening it. One such factor was the protracted
English coal strike. The German coal' industry, of
course, was the first to profit by the decline in Eng-
land's coal production. Before long, however, the
iron industry, too, found itself called to fill increas-
ing foreign orders.
Moreover, the stabilization of the French cur-
rency late in 1926mayhave been favorable to the
recovery of Germany's foreign trade. In 1924and
1925Germanexporters had been subject to the
competition of exports in countries with inflated
currencies. To estimate the full implications of such
competition is difficult, but during periods when
declines in currency exchanges had outrun price
adjustments in the countries of inflation,it was
41]probably severe. Competition of this sort had largely
ceased by the end of 1926.
Furthermore, the relative liquidity of the money
market and the concomitant rising activity in the
stock market during the spring of 1926—one of the
earliest indications of returning business optimism
—were probably related to an increased inflow of
foreign capital.
Easier credit conditions now enabled many busi-
ness organizations to repay part of their short-term
debts, or to convert them into longer-term obliga-
tions, to a large extent by foreign borrowing. In the
money markets the growing liquidity was reflected
in an expansion of the volume of funds offered for
short-term investment. Short-term money rates de-
clined rapidly during the early part of 1926, reach-
ing a level of relative equilibrium in April. The
economic organization also showed itself able to
absorb large volumes of new long-term issues, and
the rates on such issues tended to decline. Neverthe-
less, the long-term market generally continued to
be ruled by relatively high rates. The large amounts
of government loans that were offered probably re-
stricted the supplies of long-term funds available
for industrial and commercial purposes and so
tended to keep rates high.
As noted above, a continuing inflow of long-term
foreign credits undoubtedly played an important
• partin influencing the return of easier credit condi-
tions. Probably large amounts of capital funds were
[42accumulated by businessenterprises buttheir
amount is difficult to estimate. Savings bank deposits,
issues of bonds and stock shares, life insurance pre-
mium payments, however, indicated that there were
considerable accretions of domestic capital.
The Reichsbank found in December. 1925 that
the practice of rationing credit—instituted as an
emergency measure in April 1925—was no longer
necessary. Early in January it was abandoned. There-
after, the central bank, aside from its usual discrim-
ination in the purchase of eligible bills, attempted to
limit the use of its credit by relying exclusively upon
the bank rate.
Thus, diminishing domestic stocks of goods, va-
rious stimuli to exports and relatively liquid credit
conditions provided the support for a general re-
vival of German economy in the spring of 1926.
Unusual supplies of credit at relatively low rates,
together with confidence in industrial earning capac-
ity—provided by progress in industrial reorganiza-
tion—soon carried stock prices to points above those
reached at the peak of the upswing in 1925. Various
indexes of domestic trade—such as freight car load-
ings, Reichsbank clearings, postal check traffic—bear
witness to the accelerating recovery during 1926.
As indicated above, acute manifestations of the
depression of the winter of 1925—26 had been the
rapid rise in unemployment and the great number
of business failures. Although the latter declined
rapidly during the spring of 1926, unemployment
4311remained high throughout the year. The closing of
many business enterprises had much to do with ac-
celerating the rise of unemployment during the re-
cession and probably accounted for much of it even
in the summer of 1926. But a more continuous fac-
tor was the radical reconstruction that German in-
dustry and commerce were undergoing in the inter-
ests of economy. Unemployment in this sense is to
be regarded less as an inheritance from the
sion than as an aspect of the structural readjustment
-ofthe entire business system.
• b. Expansion
By the end of the winter 1926—27 the British coal
strike had ended and the inflow of capital
had slowed down. Nevertheless, German economy
continued to expand at an accelerating tempo. Sales
on both the security and the commodity markets
were increasing. Production in the coal, iron and
manufacturing industries, particularly in those mak-
ing consumption goods, rose substantially. Indeed, it
may be said that every branch of industry .took part
in the revival. The recovery seems to have been
quite as uniform in domestic business activity. In-
creased domestic business made for a large volume
of imports, and the import balance grew. Further-
more, it was reflected in fuller employment of labor
and in increasing financial security of industrial and
commercial enterprises. Thus during 1927 recovery
broadened into a period of prosperity that continued
[without serious interruption until the middle of
1928. German commerce and industry were more
active than at any time since the War.
As noted above, credit expansion, based upon
Reichsbank extensions and upon foreign loans, stim-
ulated the process of expansion. However, reviving
economic activity made for rapidly increasing de-
mands for credit, money rates advanced, and by the
middle of 1927 increasing tension in credit condi-
tions became apparent.
The level of stock prices had been rising rapidly
and with little interruption since the beginning of
1926. This was in part related to growing confidence
in the earning capacity of German industry, but it
was felt by the Reichsbank authorities to be even
more a reflection of easy money conditions that gave
support to speculators. The rise in stock prices was
considered to be disadvantageous to German econ-
omy for it was believed that high stock prices must
bring in large amounts of foreign funds, which
would be withdrawn again shortly with speculative
profits, and would lead to loss on the part of the
German credit structure. Finally, in May 1927, by
initiating an agreement among the leading private
banks to curtail drastically stock exchange credits,
the Reichsbank took steps to curb speculation. An-
nouncement of this agreement precipitated a sudden
and rapid fall in stock prices.
The Reichsbank had been out of technical con-
tact with the money markets during most of 1926
451and was obliged to exercise its influence by means
other than the discount rate and credit control. In
the early part of 1927ittook steps to regain the con-
trol of credit. For this purpose, it attempted to limit
the offers of foreign credit and the public funds,
both of which had, been important factors in ren-
dering the bank rate inoperative. This policy for a
time proved effective. During the first half of 1927
thevolume of long-term loans from abroad was
drastically reduced. Short credits, however, con-
tinued to flow into Germany in considerable vol-
ume. On the other hand, a counterfiow of German
credits to foreign countries revealed a revival of
German capacity to invest in foreign countries. Idle
government funds, which at times had been a dis-
turbing influence in the money markets, were much
diminished in 1927.Asthe banks of issue, of which
the Reichsbank is of chief importance, continued to
expand their business credits, the stimulus initiated
by foreign funds was retained by means of domestic
credit expansion. Thus for a time the Reichsbank
policy had a measure of sUccess. But the power of the
domestic market to meet the capital needs of Ger-
man economy proved inadequate, and by late spring
1927arevival of foreign borrowing was evident.
Interest rates advanced, and the central bank was
forced to raise its discount rate. The demands for
loan funds were very heavy, not only on the part of
industrial and commercial enterprises, but also from
agriculture, which, because of two years of short
[46P
crops,was in considerable credit difficulties. Further,
large borrowing operations by the public authorities
added to the tension on the capital markets. Foreign
long-term loans continued to be placed in large
volume. Short-term borrowing, too, was consider-
able. Nevertheless, the tension in the credit markets
did not relax. The brief period of credit liquidity
and of a slackened inflow of foreign funds had ended.
Despite large imports of foreign capital and the
implied confidence in German economy, despite the
growth of domestic capital supplies, interest rates
remained high. The urgency of Germany's needs for
capital led to demands that could not be satisfied
except at high rates of interest. An insufficient sup-
ply of capital hampered the German economy
throughout the years here considered. Capital scar-
city was an ominous under-current over whose sur-
face the industrial and commercial activities of the
nation rose and fell.
4. RECESSION AND DEPRESSION, 1928-1932
a.Slow Decline
Consideration of the credit situation and the
declining volume of production, together with the
continued high level of trade and consumption,
leads to the conclusion that by the middle of 1928
Germaneconomy had entered a fairly late phase in
the process of expansion. Substantial capital cx-
471penditures in industry and housing accommodation
were paralleled by a growing stringency of capital
supplies. In view of the tightening of the money
markets abroad there was little prospect of easier
credit conditions. German economic activity,so
closely dependent upon the international credit
situation, was beginning to slacken. The stock mar-
ket was inactive, the import balance had begun to
decline, and industrial production, although large,
tended to diminish. Costs of production, however,
were rising, and commodity prices at wholesale con-
tinued to advance.
Definite evidence of retardation in the rate of
expansion, and even of absolute decline in activity,
is afforded by various production series. During the
spring output in the iron and steel industries de-
clined considerably and would have fallen more but
for sustained exports. However, the volume of do-
mestic trade continued on the whole to run higher
than in i927. There was thus a contrast, in the first
half of 1928, between a. large volume of trade and a
moderate decline in the volume of production.
Unemployment in the winter of 1927—28 had been
much less severe than in the preceding two winters.
But the seasonal decline during the spring and sum-
mer of 1928 was not so pronounced as in i927. The
number of business failures, too, showed a rise over
the levels of the preceding year.
During the autumn of 1928 and the winter of
1928—29 further indications of a decline in German
[48business activity were evident. Factors of an extraor-
dinary nature were involved. A labor dispute in
the Rhenish-Westphalian steel and iron plants led
to a lockout in November and the first few days of
December that reduced their output suddenly and to
a very large extent. The effects of the lockout, of
course, extended into branches of production and
trade related to the iron industry. With the resump-
tion of work in the mills a pronounced increase in
production took place. This must be considered, at
least in large part, as compensation for the drop in
production during November.
Production and distribution were further affected
by an unprecedentedly severe winter. The average
temperature in February was the lowest since the
inauguration of weather records in Berlin early 'in
the eighteenth century. A great amount of outdoor
work had to be abandoned during the long period
of extraordinary cold from December to March, and
much indoor work dependent upon uninterrupted
material supplies and regular distribution was also
disturbed.
Germany's position as a heavy borrower of for-
eign capital made its economy sensitive to changes
in the international money markets which were es-
pecially marked in the twelve months after the
middle of 1928.Severalfactors tended to reduce the
volume of German borrowings from abroad, and,
for a time in the spring of 1929,evenled to heavy
net withdrawals of foreign funds. Chief among these
491factors were the extraordinary speculative activity in
New York, which until the autumn of 1929 attracted
money from all parts of the world and tended to
tighten the market for long-term investments; in
addition, the uncertainty of the protracted negotia-
tions on reparation payments tended to discourage
long-term loans. The United States, which had pro-
vided most of the long-term funds invested in Ger-
many and a large share of the short-term loans, now
changed its position from lender to borrower in the
international markets. The withdrawals of American
funds in Germany during the autumn of 1928 were
offset by new loans from. various European countries.
In the late winter of 1928—29 and in the spring of
1929, however, there was a net outflow of foreign
funds from Germany, accompanied by a transfer of
domestic funds abroad. In May it finally became
evident that an agreement on reparations was about
to be reached, and considerable money returned
from abroad; this more than made up for the pre-
vious outflow. Nevertheless, it seems probable that
uncertainties involved in the reparation meetings
had been sufficiently strong to restrain German busi-
ness enterprises effectively.
The tightening credit situation reflected itself in
the security markets. After the beginning of 1929
stock prices weakened considerably and a fairly cón-
tinuous decline set in.
As was noted above, industrial production was
declining towards the end of 1928; in the winter of
[501928—29 itfell to low levels. However, an increase
occurred during the late spring and summer of 1929.
Manufactures for export were greatly stimulated
by favorable conditions in world trade. Further-
more, the extraordinarily long and severe winter had
tended to postpone capital expenditures so that
building construction practically did not begin until
latespring.Subsequently,however,nearlyall
branches of industry experienced a heavy reduction
in unfilled orders, bringing about a severe decline in
industrial activity.
Figures relating to domestic trade show fluctua-
tions very similar to those in indexes of industrial
production. Large declines during the winter were
followed by increases in the second quarter of 1929
that reflected a larger volume of trade than at the
same time in 1928. This activity, too; was doubtless
in large measure a compensation for the winter
shrinkage. The volume of imports declined after
the second quarter of 1928, but exports, particularly
of finished goods, rose. Domestic demand was falling
off, but the expansion of sales abroad retarded the
effects on production.
Unemployment, as might be expected, was very
great during the •severe winter of 1928—29. It de-
dined with the return of warmer weather, but in
the autumn again rose rapidly. Business difficulties
were becoming more apparent, as reflected in
number of business failures and in the nominal
âhiountsbills protested.
511Recession was not unmistakably apparent until
the summer of 1929.Afterthen, however, there was
no doubt that activity was gradually declining and
that the probability of depression in the near future
was strong. To be sure, the intense strain in the
money markets disappeared for a time in the au-
tumn of 1929andthe spring of 19,30.Thiswas pri-
marily the result of a decline in capital expenditures
and a lessened demand for capital, which in turn
proceeded from curtailed production, particularly
of building and other forms of construction, de-
clines in domestic trade, and a rising export balance
of trade, together with a resumption of capital im-
ports. In 1930,thegeneral decline was accelerated.
Doubt and hesitation had been introduced into Ger-
man business enterprise by the events accompanying
the efforts of the 'Experts' Committee' in Paris to
effect further settlement of the reparation problem.
Disorder in the public finances continued to be a
serious factor of disturbance—particularly with re-
spect to the cost of credit. Now, the decline in busi-
ness activity in numerous other countries, reflecting
itself conspicuously in a general fall of commodity
prices, was a further element making for recession
in Germany. During 1930and1931pricesof securi-
ties and commodities declined almost without in-
terruption, industrial production and domestic trade
fell off, imports were reduced and unemployment
rose. Exports continued fairly high (although they
[52too were falling), tending to retard the downward
movement.
b. Deepening Depression
Thus in the middle of 1930Germanywas in a
deep depression, a situation similar to that in other
industrial countries. But Germany was peculiarly
sensitive to disturbances at home and abroad, espe-
cially because of its vast short-term indebtedness.
As was indicated above, credit conditions became
somewhat easier during the first half of 1930, and
foreign funds were again available in considerable
volume. But revelation of the strength of the ex-
treme political parties in the Reichstag election in
September 1930ledto sudden distrust of Germany's
economic stability. For some weeks thereafter the
outflow of foreign capital was heavy. Although by
the end of the year funds were returning, foreign
creditors remained alert and apprehensive.
In the late spring of .1931 a series of economic and
political disturbances, issuing immediately out of
the failure of the Austrian Creditanstalt, impinged
upon German economy and gave the impulse for
renewed exports of loan funds. By mid-summer the
outward flow of capital had taken on the aspect of
a panic., and the financial structure of Germany was
threatened with collapse. Approximately 2.9 milliard
Reichsmarks of short.term credits were withdrawn
in the first seven months of 1931,largelyin June
Iand July.'° The summer witnessed several bank-
ruptcies involving leading commercial organizations
and insolvency on the part of several large banks.
The panic reached its climax in July and August,
when the banks were temporarily closed. The stock
exchanges were closed for the remainder of the year.
Extraordinary measures of exchange and credit con-
trol by the Reichsbank and the Government, a
moratorium of political debts and conclusion by
leading creditors of a 'Standstill Agreement', in-
tended to retain foreign funds subject to partial
repayment from time to time, were attempted to
relieve the highly critical tension. However, funds
continued to flow out. It is estimated that about one
milliard Reichsmarks of short-term foreign debts
were repaid between July and November." The
reserve and credit position of the Reichsbank was
strained to the utmost by the withdrawals of credits
from abroad. Government support was extended to
the banks. By a series of 'emergency decrees' the
Government was able to exercise considerable con-
trol over private enterprise in general.
The decline in industrial production seemed to be
slackening somewhat during the spring of '93'. But
the capital withdrawals and the credit panic during
the summer led to renewed and sharp reduction.
Output inallindustries declinedprogressively
throughout the remainder 'of the year and well into
10Reportof the Special Advisory Committee, etc., Economist, January
2, 1932.
11FrankfurterZeitung, November 1, 1931, p. 5.
[54the spring of 1932.However,output of consumption
goods fell off somewhat less than that of production
goods.12 The labor market was further seriously un-
dermined from the summer of 1931 to the summer
of Reducedindustrial production, of both
cyclical and seasonal nature, led to record unemploy-
ment of approximately 6,200,000 workers by March
The income of the working population was
further drastically reduced, not only because of
growing unemployment, but also because of a. larger
proportion of part-time work and lowered wage
rates.
Problems of government finance became more
serious as the general decline continued. More and
more the Reich, state and local governments were
forced to attempt. to reduce expenditures and to find
new sources of revenue. But their efforts were ham-
pered increasingly by the demands •,for social relief
and the lowered national income. Thus the burden
of government on the economy became heavier dur-
ing the course of the depression.
Reduced income and the gradual depletion of
reserves of purchasing power (which hitherto had
helped to lighten the burdens of depression) were
reflected in declining domestic trade and consump-
tion. It is likely that the quality, as well as the quan-
By mid-summer, 1932, the outputof productiongoods had to
50 per cent of the 1928 average, whereas the output of consumption
goods was maintained at about 75 per cent of that average.
In this period, too, 'invisible' unemployment was much increased;
see Ch. II, footnote 52.
55]tity, of goods consumed was lowered. Commodity
prices declined further, until by the middle of 1932
thegeneral price index was about5 per centbelow
the level of 1913.Foreigntrade, too, was diminished
in value. Imports, reflecting the reduced industrial
output, tended to decline throughout the year after
the summer of 1931.Exportsrose for a time in the
autumn of 1931,particularlyin response to large
orders from Russia, but thereafter fell steadily and
rapidly. Increasing hindrances to foreign trade and
the competition of countries with depreciated cur-
rencies seem to have hastened this decline.
The pressure on the German credit structure re-
mained heavy during the autumn of 1931andthe
subsequent winter. Faced with declining deposits,
the commercial and savings banks found impossible
any corresponding reduction of outstanding credits.
The demands made on them could be met only by
continued large discounts of bills with the Reichs-
bank. Consequently the credit of the Reichsbank
expanded markedly at the same time that its reserves
of gold and exchange were reduced. The decline of
the surplus of• exports over imports necessitated the
continuance of rigid control over foreign exchange
and further agreements with Germany's creditors
leading to reduction of interest rates and conversion
of short-term advances into long-term credits. How-
ever, during the early months of 1932adecline in
the volume of commercial bills drawn and in the
banks' demands on the Reichsbank, a retardation of
[56the decline in savings bank deposits, and the resump-
tion of official trading on the German security mar-
kets, indicated that the strain associated with the
credit panic had relaxed.
5.HESITANT REVIVAL,
The long depression seems to have reached its
nadir about the middle of 1932.Thereaftera res-
toration of business confidence was increasingly
evident. Chief among the factors making for revival
was a resumption of production that compensated
for the extraordinary declines of1931andearly
1932.Industrialoutput was so much contracted af-
ter the credit crisis that it was insufficient to meet
current consumer demands and the needs of main-
taining industrial Thus, at least a mea-
sure of revival was necessary to increase nearly
exhausted stocks of retailers, jobbers and manufac-
turers, and to make industrial repairs and replace-
ments. Moreover, as the necessity to liquidate old
commodity stocks disappeared, the downward pres-
sure on the price system relaxed. The steadying of
prices in itself was a stimulus to renewed activity in
industry and trade. Furthermore, the Lausánne
agreement (June i6, 1932)tosuspend reparation
payments andstrenuously renewed efforts of the
Reich government to expand production and em-
ployment led to an improvement of business senti-
ment.
57]Production in many lines of industry became in-
creasingly active during the autumn; in others, the
decline in output was checked. The general index
of industrial production rose by nearly io per cent
in the three months, August to November. Improve-
ment was most marked in the building, coal, iron
and consumption goods industries. Increased pro-
duction led to an expansion of employment. The
various indexes of industrial employment show con-
siderable rises from August to November, in contrast
to declines during the corresponding periods of 1930
and1931.Domestictrade was enlivened, too, though
more as a result of restocking by distributors than
because of increased consumption, Measures of con-
sumption, indeed, indicate continued decline dur-
ing the second half of 1932.Commodityprices gen-
erally fell less rapidly, and there were pronounced
rises in many raw materials prices. In consequence
of steadier prices and increased industrial actiyity,
imports of raw materials and semi-finished goods
rose. Exports also showed a revival in the autumn,
but this was largely a seasonal movement.
The provisional consolidation of Germany's short-
term foreign indebtedness, together with the virtual
cancellation of reparations, contributed to greater
liquidity in the money markets. During the autumn
interest rates declined, the pressure of banks on their
debtors was reduced, and the prospects for convert-
ing short-term credits into long-term loansim-
proved. The prices of stocks, reflecting the easier
[58credit conditions and the industrial revival, con-
tinued to rise gradually. Signs of growing business
security were manifest in the declining numbers of
bankruptcies, receiverships and bill protests. Never-
theless, new long-term credits remained difficult to
obtain except at costs that made their profitable use
seem very doubtful.
Seasonal influences during the winter of 1932—33
interrupted the rise in industrial output, employ-
ment and trade, but in the early spring of 1933the
general advance was resumed. Prices of raw materials
and finished goods became firmer, and this tended
to make more satisfactory the relationship between
industrial costs and income. But difficulties that had
become increasingly apparent during the course of
the depression hindered the progress of revival.
Despite the easing of the money markets, the sup-
plies of long-term credits for industrial expansion
remained meager. Domestic banks and business en-
•terprises and foreign lenders were primarily inter-
ested in the continuing liquidation of debts. The
presence of a large reserve of domestic consumer
purchasing power might have acted as a support and
stimulus for industrial once prices were
steady. However, the long depression had greatly
reduced both the incomes and the savings of individ-
uals and business enterprises. The downward pres-
sure on wages continued into 1933,andsuch busi-
ness profits as accrued were applied to a considerable
extent to the reduction of liabilities. Also, the grow-ing resistance of world markets to German goods
made improbable a stimulus from export trade. Al-
though construction Costs were at a low point, the
meager purchasing. power in domestic and foreign
markets, together with the large surplus productive
capacity of many industries, threatened that returns
on new investments would be inadequate. There
was, then, little incentive to make extensive addi-
tions to the existing plant.
Thus, the growing necessity of replacing capital
goods and durable consumption goods, the deple-
tion of commodity surpluses, the gradual increase
of credit liquidity together with more and more
vigorous support of the economy by an aggressive,
firmly entrenched government, provided the chief
impulses in the direction of revival. But the contin-
uance of economic distress among the masses of
urban and agricultural consumers, the declining
export surplus, the uncertainties involved in obtain-
ing and applying new .capital investments, made the
progress of the upswing slow and uncertain.
6. SUMMARY'4
The months immediately subsequent to currency
stabilization were characterized, in general, by de-
pression. In the last quarter of 1923, this was espe-
Twenty-four series pertaining to various aspects of German economy
are presented in Chart i.Thischart may be helpful in illuminating the
course of the economy from 1924to1933.
[6o.cially evident in large unemployment. The short
period of credit ex.pansion and increased business
activity—February to April, 1924—which followed
is probably to be attributed in large part to Reichs-
bank policy. However, when the new currency
seemed endangered, credit was sharply curtailed.
The underlying depressed situation again became
apparent in greater unemployment and a heavy toll
of bankruptcies. After August there was considerable
improvement, accompanying the large borrowing
of foreign funds that followed the acceptance of the
Dawes Plan. During the autumn and winter of 1924
increasingactivity was evident in indexes of indus-
trial production, trade and employment. But the
number of insolvencies remained high—a manifes-
tation of structural reorganization in German econ-
After the beginning of 1925theinflow of for-
eign loans diminished markedly. This may account
for the unclear picture of business during the early
months of that year. Production and consumption
continued to rise for a time, but by the end of spring
symptoms of recession were apparent.
The cyclical upswing definitely came to an end
in the summer of 1925.Thesharp recession in the
autumn of that year was characterized particularly
by accelerating increases in unemployment, business
failures and liquidation. Industrial production and
commercial activity reflected their decline in• most
economic series. The essential difficulties were ap-
parently in business organization rather than in
6i]finance. Indeed, credit was withdrawn from un-
profitable concerns, but it did not become suddenly
and universallyunobtainable. Moresignificant
factors involved in the recession were those asso-
ciated with practices of administration and forms of
organization that had developed during the War
and the inflation and could not survive under condi-
tions of currency stability. Also, German industry
had not yet had the opportunity to adapt itself to
more advanced methods of production. Administra-
tive and technical reforms were necessary in order
to restore the world competitive strength of the
German economy.
The depression that characterized the winter of
1925—26didnot last long, reaching its turning-point
early in i 926.Easierdomestic credit conditions, im-
proving business organization and industrial tech-
nique, together with external stimuli—chiefly the
continuing inflow of foreign capital and the severe
British coal strike—made for gradual. but definite
recovery of German business during the late spring
and summer. Unemployment was one of the few
economic series that failed to show very consider-
able improvement by the autumn of 1926.However,
heavy unemployment and the numerous business
failures must be viewed, as aspects of structural re-
organization.
Recovery broadened into a period of prosperity
during 1927 which continued until the spring of
1928. Business activity was widely extended and its
[62manifestations in production, consumption and em-
ployment were fairly uniform. However, substantial
capital expenditures were paralleled by a growing
stringency of capital supplies. By the end of spring,
1928,itwas apparent that the intensive activity was
giving way to decline. To be sure, consumption and
trade were still at high levels and the labor market
was in a relatively satisfactory condition. But money
rates were rising, the physical volume of production
in certain industries was declining and there were
indications of increasing business difficulties. The
period of general economic advance—which, with
qualifications, may be regarded as a time of pros-
perity—now gave way to slow recession.
The autumn of 1928wasmarked by a downward
trend of business as a whole, a relatively stable vol-
ume of consumption, a slowing down of capital ex-
penditures and an expansion of exports. The lock-
out in the Rhenish-Westphalian steel and iron, in-
dustry in November 1928acceleratedthe seasonal
rise• in unemployment and reduced the activity of
other industries. In the early months of 1929the
effects of the lockout were aggravated by weather
of unprecedented severity. The decline of industrial
production during the winter was counterbalanced
by increased activity during the spring and summer
of 1929.However,other factors, particularly those
connected with credit, continued to exercise a re-
straining influence. Credit stringency was aggravated
by protracted reparation negotiations, by extraordi-
63]nary demands for capital in other countries, by the
unsatisfactory financial showing of many public
bodies. Decline deepened into depression during the
winter. Throughout i930industrial production and
commercial activity continued to contract, unem-
ployment rose, and commodity imports and prices
fell to low levels. In the autumn, after the growing
strength of the extreme political parties had become
apparent, there was a heavy outflow of foreign cap-
ital, but by the end of the year funds were returning.
A series of pOlitical and economic disturbances dur-
ing the spring and summer of 1931gavethe impulse
for a renewed outflow of loan funds, which in the
middle of the summer took on the aspect of a panic.
Unusual measures of Government control were re-
quired to prevent financial collapse. The decline in
general economic activity, as reflected in numerous
indexes of production, trade and prices, was acceler-
ated by the credit panic. The winter of 1931—32
and the following spring found German economy
in deep depression. During the summer and autumn
of 1932 depression gave way to a hesitant revival.
Production, employment and trade rose, prices were
strengthened, and the money markets recovered
from their paralysis. The growing necessity of fill-
ing depleted commodity stocks and restoring out-
worn capital and consumers' goods, together with
the gradual liquidation of the debt burden, seem to
have been the main reviving factors. Although their
influence extended into 1933, recovery was
[64uncertain. The economy continued to labor under
powerful depressive burdens proceedingchiefly
from the narrowness of both domestic and foreign
capital and commodity markets.
B. Significant Aspects of German Economy,
1924—1933
Theforegoing attempt to describe the totality of
the cyclical course of German economy from early
1924tothe spring of 1933indicatesthat the fluc-
tuations of an economy are the expression of a com-
plex of changes in a great variety of processes and
that each of these processes is itself a complex of
variables. Limitations of space and time, however,
demand that the study confine itself to what are
considered to be essential features of the ebb and
flow of the economy.
This section is a summary reconsideration of as-
pects of German economy that appear to be closely
connected with the character of its cyclical fluctua-
tions. They have already been emphasized, but
hitherto the discussion has been built around the
framework provided by the successive phases of the
business cycles—recovery, prosperity, recession, de-
pression. It is believed that a review of some of these
aspects—one by one, rather than chronologically—
may further illuminate the nature of the cyclical
fluctuations in the post-stabilization period.
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Through the mass of literature pertaining to
German economy since the currency stabilization
there runs, like a red thread, the term Kapitalnot—
need for capital. Wherever one's interests lie—in
agriculture or in industry, in state finances or in
community affairs, in the universities or in the
transportation system—one meets with the opinion
that German economy is weakened by a lack of
capital.
a. Capital Losses, 1914—1922
Explanationof the great capital losses of Ger-
many is to be found in the story of the events that
occurred from 1914to1923.Theintense strain of
the World War made heavy demands upon the sup-
ply of capital goods, and much that was worn out
or destroyed was not renewed or restored. Further-
more, the requisitions of the victorious powers dur-
ing the period 1918—23ledto additional large
capital losses. The diflicult years after the War,
fraught with economic and political uncertainties,
currency inflation and reparation quarrels, were
characterized not only by reductio.n of capital sup-
plies .but also by the accumulation of much ineffi-
cient or superfluous production equipment.
Estimates in monetary terms of the net reduction
in Germany's national income and wealth in the
period of War and inflation are subject to wide mar-
[72gins of error. Moulton and McGuire estimate the
losses sustained from 1914to1921 as a consequence
of reduction in productive capacity, depreciation of
plant and equipment, damage caused by the Rus-
sian invasion of East Prussia, surrender of foreign
investments and other properties in accordance with
the peace treaty, and from the decline in stocks of
consumption goods, as amounting to 135 billion
gold marks.'5 This would make the total losshigh
as 45 per cent of the 1913wealthof Germany.1°
Evidence of German production in the years im-
mediately following the War indicates that this per-
centage is somewhat too high.17 Nevertheless, in the
absence of more accurate data, it may serve to illus-
trate the seriousness of Germany's economic losses
incurred during and immediately after the War.
National income in the inflation years, 1920—23,
was undoubtedly much below the pre-War levels.18
But no accurate estimate can be made of the loss of
H. G. Moulton and C. E. McGuire, Germany's Capacity to Pay (Mc.
Craw-Hill, 1923),pp.tgo—3.
KarlHeliferich's estimate of Germany's national wealth in 1913was
mifliard marks; Deutschlands Volkswohlstand, 1888—1913(Stilke,
Berlin, 1915),p.122.
17 SeeJ. W. Angel!, The Recovery of Germany, p. 15;F.D. Graham,
Exchange,Prices, and Productionin Hyper-Inflation, Germany, 1920—
1923(PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton, 1931),pp.277—320.
18 SeeGraham,cit., for estimates of production in the years of the
inflation. There is reason to believe that the national income in 1923,
theyear of the Ruhr invasion and final currency collapse, was roughly
40percent below the 1913level.In 1924,however,it was probably al-
most as great as in (in terms of purchasingpower of the
mark)—an indication of the very rapid recovery of German economy
after the currency stabilization.
73]
4capital in these years. It is of interest here to note
certain influences of the inflationary disturbances
upon the accumulation of capital. Possibly the evils
of the German inflation have been exaggerated, at
least in terms of the national economy; nevertheless,
its consequences were very serious. It is true that
there was considerable saving during this period,
both on the part of individuals and of corporate en-
terprises. Indeed, after the stabilization it looked
at first as if the German economy were plentifully
suppliedwithcapitalgoods—machines,factory
buildings and other production equipment. Closer
examination, however, revealed that a considerable
part of these goods was highly depreciated and
economically ineffective. The rapid and almost con-
tinuous inflation of the currency stimulated invest-
rnent of surplus income in every variety of durable
goods, regardless of whether or not it could promise
adequate future productiveness. Of paramount im-
portance at the moment was the conversion of dizzily
depreciating paper marks into anything tangible.
Later, during the period of industrial 'rationaliza-
tion', from 1925to1928,itwas found necessary to
scrap much of such 'inflation capital'.
Furthermore, the inflation reduced the loans of
innumerable creditors to utter worthlessness and
thereby sapped the foundations of the confidence
essential to a restoration of the old credit system.
Also, bitter memories of sudden dissipation of hard-
won savings and investments acted as a brake upon
[74
.incentives to save; even after the stabilized currency
seemed quite secure. These factors undoubtedly
contributed to the scarcity of loan-fund capital and
the credit restrictions of the months immediately
following stabilization. Probably most of the Ger-
man foreign investments that remained at the end
of the War were wiped out during the inflation pe-
riod. Finally, the spectaculaf 'flight from the mark'
led to a very appreciable export of capital from
Germany.19
Thus, "at the close of 1923 German business was
nearly bankrupt. The inflation and subsequent sta-
bilization had wiped out most of its working capital,
and not only were there no funds available for re-
construction, there was often not even enough to
carry on daily operations."
20Germanywas in dire
need of loan-fund capital. This need was most acute
immediately after stabilization, but the effects of
the decade of war and inflation were felt through-
out the period here considered. They were wounds
that could not be healed in the course of seven or
eight years.
Theso-called McKenna Committee, which was appointed by the Rep-
aration Commission in November 1923forthe purpose of determining
the amount of German capital abroad, and the means for bringing it
back to Germany, estimated it to be approximately 6.75 milliard marks.
This amount, however, does not appear to be identical with the 'flight
from the mark'. See Reports of the Expert Committee appointed by the
Reparation Commission (London, 1924),pp.126—38.Seealso Angell,
op. cit., pp. 17—60, and Graham, op. cit., passirn, for consideration of the
effects of the inflation upon German economy.
20AngeIt, op. cit., p. '90.
75]0
Thework of reconstruction was closely depend-
ent upon the processes of capital accumulation. The
needs of a growing. population, accustomed to rela-
tively high standards of living, and obligations to
pay large foreign political debts required greater
productivity. But extension and renovation of the
economic machinery—entailing vast capital invest-
ments—was a precedent condition
/ tosuch
increased productivity.2' The public authorities, in
addition to borrowing in order to subsidize the erec-
tion of dwellings, sought funds in large amounts to
fulfill sweeping programs of construction for other
public purposes—stadia, schools and museums, as
well as railways, power plants, canals and harbors.
Germany's population increased from 62,846,000 in 1924toabout
65,092,000 in 1930—agrowthof approximately 374,000eachyear.
The population pressure was especially felt in the lack of-adequate
housing facilities. As in other countries, a shortage of dwellings was a
consequence of the War. But it was especially pronounced in Germany
because even before the War housing had been inadequate. The Reich,
state and commune governments were much interested in encouraging
building construction, and about half the funds used for such purposes
from 1924to 1930 wereobtained through the public authorities(see
Reports of the Agent General for Reparation Payments, December io,
1927,p.156;May21,1930, p. Furthermore, the working popula-
tion was increasing more rapidly than the total population. It has been
estimated that at the beginning of 1930thenumber of potential income
producers was 5 per cent greater than in 1925,whereasthe total popula-
tion had grown by onlyper cent(Statistisches Jahrbuch für das
Deutsche Reich, 1931,pp.7. t8). For this reason alone, therefore, it was
socially desirable that Germany's capital equipment expand relatively
more than its total population.
The reparation burden was a special factor making for productive
expansion. With very little left of its pre-War foreign investments, it
was necessary for German economy to prepare to meet this obligation
ultimately by the exportation of goods and services.
[76Further demands for loan-fund capital, less social in
nature, came from private enterprise, which was
interested in improving plant and equipment for
the purpose of lowering production costs and ex-
panding profits. Agriculture, by reason of special
difficulties confronting it, also became a heavy and
consistent borrower. As the activity of trade and
industry began to gather momentum, heavy de-
mands were made for the purpose of carrying goods
through the processes of production and distribu-
tion,
b. Domestic Accumulation of Capital, 1924—1933
Theinternal accumulation of capital made great
progress during• the yearsi 92 4—30, but it was not
nearly sufficient to satisfy this combination of de-
inands. The relatively high interest rates, the almost
continuously strained condition of the money mar-
kets, manifested the size and urgency of Germany's
need for capital.
It is difficult to form a clear picture of the extent
of domestic capital accumulation during the years
after the Nevertheless, several authorities
have essayed estimates. James W. Angel! fixes the
total of domestic savings in the years 1924—2 8 at 24
""Thequestion of the magnitude of these savings has been a highly
controversial one in Germany. The estimates vary widely, and are
often based on entirely dissimilar methods. No figure can be reached
which is assuredly correct, and the estimate finally selected must neces-
sarily rest to a considerable extent on individual judgment." (Angell,
op. cit., p. 326).
77:1to 25 milliard Reichsmarks.23 He approximates the








The most extensive estimate, in terms of the period
embraced, was made by Erich Welter, financial
editor of the Frankfurter Zeitung:
Net Domestic Additions to Capital, 1925—1930








Welter suggests that national saving declined rap-
This total is the sum of net public security issues, land mortgages,
estimated savings of business enterprises, savings deposits, insurance and
government savings,etc.,lessestimated duplications. Allowing for
estimated losses in agriculture, the net domestic addition to domestic
capital is approximated at 20 to 21 milliard Reichsmarks(Ibid., pp.
326, 327, 408).
24SeeFrankfurter Zeitung, May 8, 1931,p.Wirtschaftskurve.
derFrankfurter Zeitung, Vol. 7, Nr. 1928,pp. 301—5; H. R. Knicker-
bocker in the New York Evening Post, January 29, 1932, p. 2. Welter's
estimates are based upon various evidences of increase of loan-fund
capital.
[78idly in the first half of 1931, and that after the bank
credit crisis of the summer, capital accumulation
gave to net capital consumption.25 The general
tendency portrayed in estimates of national savings
TABLE 2
EVIDENCE OF THE VOLUME OF SAVINGS, 1924-1931'
(in millions of Reichsmarks)
TOTAL SAVINCS
ANNUAL VOLUME ANNUAL EXCESS OF
DEPOSITS IN
OF I)OMESTIC INSURANCE PREMIUMS
S PA RK ASS E N
CAPITAL ISSUES OVER PAYMENTS




1926 3,091 988 592
1927 4,665 2,8411,438 759
1928 6,990 2,9051,339 871
1929 9,0i6 874
1930 10,400 2,667555 973
1931 9,722 1,333784
1932 9,917 558 145
'StatistischesJahrbuch, 1928—1932, Institut für Konjunktur-
forschung, Viertelfahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung, 1926—1933, pas-
si in.
is fairly well confirmed by such evidences of capital
formation, published currently, as the annual vol-
25Estimatesof capital accumulation in 1925, 1926 and 1927 made by
the Reichskreditgesellschaft—a bank indirectly owned by the Reich
—are 6.4, 6.3 and 7.6 milliard Reichsmarks. These figures are arrived
at l)y deducting capital imports, less such as was used for currency
cover,fromtheestimatedsurplusofproduction(Reichskredit-
gesellschaft, Germany's Economic Development During the Second
Half of the l'ear 1927,p. 15).
Astudy by the German Institut für Konjunkturforschung indicates
that the increase in capital goods iii German economy, 1924—28, was
about 42 milliarcl Reichsrnarks. Subtracting capital imports from this
79]ume of savings bank deposits, new capital issues and
the excess of insurance premiums over payments.
On the basis of such evidence as this it may be
said that the accumulation of capital immediately
after currency stabilization was much below that in
the period immediately preceding the War. After
1924therewas a rapid increase, but beginning in
1929adecline in the rate of accumulation set
in. The years 1931and1932haveprobably wit-
nessed a net reduction in domestic capital
Total national savings during the years 1924—30
weresurprisingly large, in view of the extraordinary
political and economic difficulties of the preceding
decade (at a guess, these savings might be put some-
where between 40and45 milliard Reichsmarks).
Nevertheless they were not nearly sufficient to meet
the needs of the economy.27
total gives the sum of 28 milliard Reichsmarks as representing domes-
tic additions to capital supplies(Institut für Konjunkturforschung,
Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung, Sonderheft22,Kapital-
bildung und Investitionen in der deutschen Volkswirtschaft, 1924 bis
1928, Berlin, 1930).
Thewidely-quoted estiniate of Karl Heliferich is that national say-
ings in amountedto approximately milliard gold marks
(bc. cit.). In terms of mark purchasing power in 1928 this would
amount to about 13milliard.
Reichskreditgesellschaft, Germany's Economic Situation at the Turn
of 193.2—33,p.40.
There is reason to believe that the proportion of national income
saved in the post-inflation period was less than before the War. One
of the most significant factors making for a reduction in savings in
recent yearsis the change in the distribution of personal income.
Since the War there has been a pronounced decline in the total
amount of large individual incomes. For instance, the total of per-
sonal incomes over marks a year is estimated to have fallen from
[8oEvidence of the inadequacy of capital is afforded
by the relatively high interest rates prevailing in
Germany throughout this period and by the con-
sequent inflow of foreign funds. Discount rates of
private banks in leading financial centers may be
considered representative for present purposes.
29.9 per cent of national income in 1913(in terms of 1928 mark
purchasing power) to 23.8 per cent in 1928. This shiftis especially
marked in the higher income brackets. The sum of incomes over
50,000 marks (1928 purchasing power) amounted to 10.7 per cent of
national income in 1913andonly 3.5 per cent in 1928 (see Stat istisches
Jahrbuch ....,1931,p. 533).
The post-War growth in the burden of government—manifested in
heavy per capita tax charges—has also tended to decrease the volume
of national savings. Angell (op. cit., p. estimates the total 'real'
cost of government to be 65 per cent greater in 1928 than in 1913.
Reparationpayments, moreover, have been an outright drain on sav-
ings. Saving tends, of course, to be relatively larger on the part of
individuals receiving higher (or 'surplus') incomes than of individuals
of smaller means. A reduction in the total amount of 'surplus' in-
comes should lead, ceteris paribus, to a reduction in national savings.
Furthermore, fear of the loss of individual wealth—exaggerated by
memories of losses incurred during the inflation period—may have
contributed to restrain somewhat the willingness to save even after
stabilization was effected (see Erich Welter, Die Ursachen des Kapital-
mangels in Deutschland, Mohr, Tübingen, 1931, passim).
The estimates of national income and savings appear to indicate
that although total annual income after 1926 was greater than in
igig, the proportion saved was less than in the last pre-War year.
Thus, out of a total income in 1913 oF 65—69 milliard marks (1928
Reichsmark purchasing power), something like 12,000 or 13,000mil-
lion, or 17 to 20 per cent, was saved(Heliferich, cit., p.122;
Statistisches Reichsamt, Das deutsche Votkseinkommen vor und nach
dem Kriege, Einzelschrift Nr. 24...., Berlin, p. 69). In 1928,
however, out of a total income of approximately 75 milliard, there
was a saving of 9 milliard, at most, or about 12 per cent(see Wirt-
schaftskurve...derFrankfurter Zeitung, Vol. 7, Nr. 3,1928, pp.
301—5).
8i]TABLE 3
PRIVATE DISCOUNT RATES ON PRIME BANKERS'
ACCEPTANCES1
(annual averages)
YEAR BERLIN LONDON PARIS NEW YORK
!913 4.98 4.39 3.84 5.58
1924 9.202 3.46 5.21 3.11
1925 7.62 4.13 5.77 3.32
1926 4.88 4.46 5.66 3.59
1927 5.47 4.23 2.91 3.45
1928 6.54 4.16 2.98 4.10
1929 8.87 5.26 3.46 5.03
1930 4.43 2.57 2.32 2.46
1931 3.60 1.57 1.58
1932 4.95 i.88 1.31 1.31
Statistisches Jahrbuch. ..., 1928,supplement, pp. 168—9; Federal Re-
serve Bulletin, 1928—33,passlm.
'December rate.
'Average of eleven months, no rate available for August 1931.
As is apparent in Tabletheannual averages of
representative short-term money ratesin Berlin
after stabilization were considerably higher than
corresponding rates in London and New York, and,
with one exception, much higher. than those in
Paris. The spread between German and foreign
long-term money rates was even greater.
c. Inflow of Foreign Capital, 1924—1930
Capital imports to Germany took the form not
only of long- and short-term loans but also of direct
participation in domestic business enterprise, of
purchases of stock shares, buildings and land. How-
[82TABLE 4
ESTIMATE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN GERMANY'
1924—1931
(in milliards of Reichsmarks at end of year)
SHORT-TERM LONG-TERM OTHER TOTAL
YEAR
IN VESTMENT INVESTMENTINVESTMENTS INVESTMENTS
1924 Unknown i.o UnknownUnknown
1925 Unknown 2.5 UnknownUnknown
£926 4.1 4.1 3.5 11.7
1927 6.6 5.4 4.5 16.5
1928 9.0 7.0 5.5 21.5
1929 11.7 7.3 6.o 25.0
1930 10.3 9.2 6.o 25.5
July
£931 8.o 9.0 6.o
1Reportof Committee Appointed on the Recom?nendation of the
London Conference, £931, Annex ui, in the Economist, August 22.
1931,Supplement.
The distribution of the foreign investment of 23 milliard Reichsmarks
in Germany in July 1931 was indicated, to be as follows:*
SHORT-TERM
Public authorities o8
Banks on currentaccounts, acceptance
creditsand otherliabilities 5.1
Other short-term
Reichsbank and Golddiskontbank credits o.6 8.o
LONG-TERM
Foreign issues 8.5
Mortgage credits, etc. o.i
German internal issues 0.4 9.0
OTHER
Shares and other holdings 4.0
Real estate 2.0 6.o
23.0
'Ibid., Annex IV. Investigations by the German government, made
subsequent to the report of the Wiggin Committee, show that the
total commercial foreign debt, and especially the amount borrowedat short-term, was larger in July 1931 than is indicated in the above
estimate. The short-term loans were fixed at13.1milliard Reichs-
marks and the long-term investments at 10.7 milliard. Other invest-
ments were held to amount to 5.9 milliard. This would bring the
total foreign capital in Germany in July 1931 to about 29.7 milliard
Reichsmarks and probably to about 32 milliard in December 1930.
In February 1932 the short-term debt was estimated to amount to
8.7 milliard, and the long-term debt, to 10.3 milliard(see Frank.
furter Zeitung, November 1, 1931, p.Wirtschaft und Statistik, Vol.
13, Nr. i6, Pp. 486—8).
ever,there is reason to believe that loans have made
up the bulk of the capital inflow.28
The committee appointed on the recommenda-
tion of the London conference of July 20—23, 1931
(generally known as the Wiggin Committee) esti-
• mated the investment of foreign capital in Germany
• tobe. as shown in Table 4. The foreign loans are
estimated by the German Registry Office for Foreign
Indebtedness to have been reduced between July
1931 and October 1932 bymilliard Reichsmarks,
representing a reduction of 3.8 milliard in short-
term credits and of0.5miliiardin long-term
29
Thusthe inflow of foreign funds was very rapid
until 1929, but afterward, just as in the case of do-
mestic capital accumulation, the rate of increase
declined. In 1931 and 1932 increase of foreign in-
vestments gave way to net decrease.
The differential between German and foreign
Angell, op. Cit., p. 192.
Reichsamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik, Vol. •Nr.
pp. 273—6.
[84interest rates was so continuously large that it suf-
ficed to ensure a fairly steady volume of long-term
loans from abroad (even during the recession of
1925—26)untilabout the end of 1928.Theremark-
ably rapid upward trend of German economy in the
period 1924—28 paralleled the uninterrupted and
equally rapid increase in the capital supply made
available by domestic saving and long-term borrow-
ing from abroad. The decline in 1929 of loans of
lông maturity is attributable in part to Reichsbank
policy of reducing foreign borrowing, but more to
strained conditions in foreign speculative markets.
In 1930, however, loans of this type were again ex-
tended in large amount to German economy.
The inflow of short-term credits manifests a much
closer relationship with fluctuations of German
economy. In 1925, reflecting high industrial produc-
tion and heavy raw materials imports, and the con-
sequent need for credits, the inflow of short-term
funds was maintained at the high level of approxi-
mately 200 million Reichsmarks per How-
ever, towards the end of the year, with the begin-
fling of recession, production sank and money rates
declined. The inflow of short.term credits also fell
off, and for a time during the first half of 19,26 there
was even an outflow. With the beginning of recov-
ery was initiated another period of heavy inflow of
According to an estimate in Vierteljahrsheftezur Konjunkturfor-
schung, 1929(Institutfür Konjunkturforschung), I, p. 4L.
85Jshort-term funds from abroad, which continued al-
most without interruption throughout 1927 and
1928. During the first half of there was a rapid
withdrawal of foreign short credits; afterward funds
again flowed into Germany. In 1930 and 1931, years
of sharp decline in business activity., a succession of
disturbances—to a large extent political—shook the
confidence of creditors. Heavy withdrawals of for-
eign money began in the autumn of 1930; after sub-
siding for a time, they were renewed in 1931, and
finally in the summer took on the character of a run
on the German financial structure.31 Financial col-
lapse was averted only by unusual measures of debt
moratorium and governmental control of economic
activities. The efflux continued, though at a slower
rate, during the remainder of 1931 and during 1932.
Germany was able in the post-inflation years to
begin rebuilding its own investments in foreign
countries. The Wiggin Committee estimated that
German investments abroad from the beginning of
1926tothe end of amounted to approximately.
9.7 milliard Reichsmarks.32
Theshort-term credits are estimated to have declined one milliard
Reichsmarks between the end of July 1931andthe beginning of
November (Frankfurter Zeitung, November i,1931, p.5).
Reportof Committee Appointed on the Recommendation of the
London Conference, 1931,AnnexIII, in the Economist, August 22,
1931, Supplement.
The application of new capital supplies in the years 1924—28(from
domestic as well as foreign sources) is shown by the Institut für Kon-
junkturforschung to have been as follows:*
[86- -
PLANT AND EQUIPMENT COMMODITY STOCKS
AMOUNT IN PER- AMOUNT IN PER-
MILLIONS CENT- MILLIONS CENT-
OF KEICHS-AGE OF OF REICRS-AGE OF
MARKS TOTAL MARKS TOTAL
Industry 3548 13.3 5408 43.3
Electricpower, gas
and water plants 2596 9.7 6o
Transportation 4379 16.3 —g8 —o.8
Agriculture 2402 8.9 239 1.9
Handicraft 705 2.6 566 4.5
Retail trade 628 2.3 4437 35.5






social insurance 341 1.3
Othereconomic
gioups 781 2.9
Total 26830 100.0 12492 100.0
Total investment in plant and equipment 26830 million Reichsmarks
Total investment in commodity stocks ...12492
Increase in the gold stocks of the banks of
isSUe 2274
*StatistischesJahrbuch,1931, p.536.(This tableistaken from
Institut für Konjunkturforschung, Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunktur-
forschung, Sonderheft 22, Kapitalbildung und Investitionen in der
deutschen Volkswirtschaft, 1924 bis 1928, Berlin, 1930).
Thus,of the capital supplies made available to German economy
in 1924—28 something like 26 per cent went to industry; ig per cent
was taken by commercial enterprises; 34 per cent went to the gov-
ernments and public utilities; 7 per cent was used for agricultural
purposes; and 14 per cent was invested in dwellings. About two-thirds
of the total was applied to extension of plant and equipment.
The above table gives some clue to the amount of capital placed
in enterprises not subject to the profits criteria of private economy.
Most of the items listed tinder public' administration, public welfare
and social insurance, and residential construction, and possibly also
87]d. The the Money Market
and the Credit System
•The urgent demands for capital, not only from
industry and agriculture but also from the federal
and local governments, the insufficiency of domestic
savings and the consequent importation of foreign
funds, made for almost continuous tension in the
German money markets in the years here under
review. At times the peculiar credit situation made
responsible banking control well-nigh impossible.
This was especially pronounced in the relationship
between the inflow of foreign money and the policy
of the Reichsbank. The central bank's attempts to
control domestic money markets were often frus-
trated by the behavior of foreign funds. When the
transportation, belong in this category. The governmental policy of
liberally subsidizing construction has done much to diminish
the capital supplies to private industry and commercial en-
terprises. It is possible that many of these funds have been invested
unprofitably, from the viewpoint of private economy. Of course, in-
vestments whose pecuniary returns do not cover interest expenses
may still be socially desirable.
There has probably also been much uneconomic application of
capital in private enterprise, especially in the case of agriculture.
Moreover, investment that from the standpoint of the national econ-
omy is excessive was apparently widespread in manufacturing indus-
try. Basking in the shelter of tariffs and cartels, numerous industries
have been encouraged to expandS their productive capacity beyond
all possible social needs (Cf. Nachkriegskapitalismus, published by the
Frankfurter Zeitung, Frankfurt a.M., 1931, pp. 35—44;Angell,op. cit.,
pp. 208—1 1, 250; Ernst Wagemann, Zinshöhe und Kapitalverteilung, in
Kapital und Kapitalismus, Bernhard Harms, ed., Reimar Hobbing, Ber-
lin, 1930, pp. 356—73;Ausschusszur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs und
Absatzbedingungen der deutschen Wirtschaft, Die deutsche Eisenerzeug-
ende Industrien, Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1930, passirn).
[88Reichsbank lowered its discount rate, the differen-
tial between foreign and domestic rates was reduced,
foreign money tended to flow out, and credit mar-
kets were tightened rather than eased. When, on the
other hand, it raised its rate, in order to check credit
expansion, the rate differential widened, foreign
money tended to enter Germany and its policy was
again rendered nugatory. On several occasions credit
rationing was resorted to in order to effect a .restric-.
tive policy. Also, the Reichsbank encouraged th.e
formation of an official advisory council whose
pose it was to check extravagant foreign borrowings
of the various municipalities and municipally-owned
enterprises. However, it appears that the net effect
of these extraordinary measures was to shift demand
from foreign to domestic markets, to raise money
rates, and finally to make for increased private bor-
rowing from abroad, much of it at short-term. Also,
the Reichsbank was frequently embarrassed by the
lending operations of governmental bodies. Further-
more, large foreign purchases of German stock
shares, especially in 1926and1927,seemto have
been responsible for pushing up share prices to
levels at which stock'yields were far below the yields
of first-class' bonds.33 This rise in stock prices was
undesirable in that it brought speculative erratic
funds into German markets and also absorbed exces-
"By the end of 1926theaverage dividend return on shares listed
on the Berlin Bourse .... wasbarelyper cent. This compare4
with an average interest rate on bonds of 714percent.". (Report of
the Agent General for Reparation Payments, June zo, 1927,p.71.)
89]sive amounts of domestic credit. Early in 1927 the
Reichsbank forced a contraction in the use of credit
on the stock market. Share prices fell rapidly, and,
except for a slight revival in the spring of 1928,
continued to decline until the exchanges were closed
in July 1931.
Largedomestic issues of securities throughout
the period 1924—30 exerted heavy pressure on the
German money markets. By the end of 1930 ap-
proximately 21 milliard Reichsmarks of stocks and
bonds had been absorbed within Germany. But the
amount of potential offerings far exceeded the ab-
sorptive capacity of the domestic markets. When-
ever there were indications of easier credit condi-
tions, the markets were immediately overwhelmed
with loan applications. Large and continuous de-
mands for funds on the part of local governments
probably did much to add to the pressure. Some re-
lief was afforded by the sale of securities in foreign
countries.
The relatively great volume of short-term loans,
supported to a large extent by foreign funds, has
probably been one of the greatest potential dangers
for the entire economy. The Institut für Konjunk-
turforschung has estimated that the total volume of
outstanding debts at the end of 1930 was approxi-
mately 90 milljard Reichsmarks of which about 35
per cent consisted of short-term credits. In 1913the
volume of short-term debts was not more than 15
[90per cent of the total debt.34 But not only was the
proportionate amount of short credits much greater
than before the War. Since the stabilization such
credits have also been used to a large degree for
purposes that were formerly satisfied by long-term
loans. In the years 1924—30 domestic capital sup-
plies were inadequate to meet demands; neverthe-
less, high interest rates did not reduce the pressure
for funds. Such rates attracted foreign lenders, but,
because of political and economic uncertainties,
many of these lenders were willing to extend credits
only on the condition that they be subject to with-
drawal at short notice. Thus a situation was created
in which large amounts of funds that nominally
might be recalled within a few months were used
for fixed-capital purposes. It was a situation that
could suddenly become acute and could threaten
financial stability. "The fact that the(German)
banks....allowedthemselves to be made the
buffers between industrial and agricultural debtors,
bent on long investments, and the commercial and
banking creditors, wishing for a quick return of
their money, has shaken their foundations com-
pletely. It made them the chief sufferers, when, ow-
ing to political and commercial panic, billions were
suddenly withdrawn."
Institut für Konjunkturforschung, Wochenbericht, Vol. 4, Nr. 26,
September 23, 1931.
M.J. Bonn, Banking and Credit, in The Present Economic State of
Germany (Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft, Berlin, .1931),
p.For an interesting account of the relationships between foreign
91]The 'panic' was precipitated in the middle of
1931bythe accelerated withdrawals of foreign bal-
ances from the German banks, which led to a rapid
increase in domestic withdrawals of deposits and
culminated in a general assault on the country's
banking structure. The banks and stock exchange
were closed and vigorous measures of governmental
control were invoked. The weeks subsequent to the
panic witnessed the gradual resumption of banking
operations, extension of the Reichsbank's control
over foreign exchange, and inauguration of a mora-
torium for the larger part of foreign creditors'
claims against German industry. During the early
autumn most of the domestic funds withdrawn dur-
ing the crisis flowed back to the banks. But the for-
eign credits withdrawn during 193 i—estimated to
amount to 3 milliard Reichsmarks—did not return.
The lending capacity of the German banks was
much reduced not only in consequence of loss of
resources during the cr.edit crisis, but also because
the danger of renewed domestic withdrawals re-
quired greater insistence than formerly that loans
be liquid.
During the months after the crisis, the German
money markets—severed from foreign markets by
capital and the German money markets, see Angell, op. cit., pp. 195—
205.Seealso Reports of the Agent General for Reparation Payments,
.7925—1930,passim;Wilhelm Prion, Der deutsche Geld- und Kapital-
markt seit der Stabilisierung, in Strukturwandlungen der deutschen
Vo!kswirtschaft, II, pp. (Bernhard Harms, ed., Reimar Hob-
bing, Berlin, 1928).
[92'standstill' agreements and by exchange control, and
no longer subject to influence by surplus govern-
ment funds—became closely dependent upon the
Reichsbank. The enormous losses of foreign and do-
mestic funds, and' difficulties attending the liquida-
tion of 'frozen' loans led to rigidity and tightness in
the financial markets. The Reichsbank sought to
counteract this by reducing its discount rate and by
directly stimulating a general lowering of interest
rates. Furthermore, the central bank undertook to
thaw out German credits that were frozen in other
countries, sponsored agreements to facilitate the
transfer of payments arising in foreign trade, tight-
ened its control of exchange, and encouraged the
conversion of foreign short-term loans into long-
term loans. During 1932,largelyas a result of these
measures, the tension of the money markets relaxed
and the confidence of debtors and creditors was
gradually restored.
2.INDUSTRIALPRODUCTION
During most of the inflation period German in-
dustry—stimulated by brisk demand and protected
fromeffectiveforeigncompetition—wasactive.
Many new enterprises were founded, established
firms expanded their plants and there was a wide
extension of cartels, trusts and combines. But there
was little incentive to make technical and adminis-
trative improvements. Labor was cheap, competi-
93]tion from abroad was not greatly feared and profits
had to be invested quickly in tangibles so as to pre-
vent their dissipation.
After stabilization, however, the stimuli originat-
ing with the currency depreciation disappeared and
German industry was once more exposed to world
competition. Many enterprises that had prospered
during inflation found adjustment to the changed
situation difficult. Administrative and financial, as
well as technical, reorganization was necessary. The
urgent need for 'rationalization' became an out-
standing topic of the Private business was
assisted in the reorganization of its productive proc-
esses by agencies, subsidized by the Reich, which
sought to extend rationalization into almost every
branch of economic life.
This more or less radical reorganization of Ger-
man industry was especially pronounced from 1925
to1927. The process of correction and improvement
eliminated unprofitable business units that had been
founded during the inflation. Many aggregated con-
cerns were disintegrated or were reorganized from
'vertical' trusts into 'horizontal' combinations in
order to control the output of identical products
The Reichskuratorium für Wirtschaftlichkeit, the German central
rationalization bureau, defines rationalization as "the adoption and
employment of all the means of increasing efficiency which are fur-
nished by technical science and systematic organization. Its aim is to
raise the general level of prosperity by cheaper, more plentiful and
better quality goods." Quoted by Robert A. l3rady in The Meaning
of Rationalization: An Analysis of the Literature, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, May 1932, p. 527.
[94through the concentration of manufacture in ef-
ficient enterprises.. Inability to carry the cost of reor-
ganization, as well as technical and administrative
difficulties, led to many business failures. German
industry did not have capital sufficient to finance
rationalization alone. Foreign funds had to be se-
cured. The larger and better-known industrial or-
ganizations were able to secure the necessary capital
from abroad directly, but most firms were forced to
seek foreign capital by way of the German money
markets; this tended to make these funds more
expensive.
In spite of many difficulties, reorganization and
readjustment were carried on with characteristic
thoroughness. The speed with which this was ef-
fected was made possible mainly by the large and
rapid investment of foreign capital in Germany
after the stabilization. By 1928 the productive ca-
pacity of the leading manufacturing industries was
probably from 30 to 40 per cent greater than in
1913.Butthe foreign trade possibilities had not ex-
panded enough, nor was the home market suf-
ficiently expansive to support so large a productive
capacity. The actual physical volume of industrial
output of the leading manufacturing industries was
probably "less than 15 per cent above the 1913vol-
ume."Afterthe period of swift recovery and ex-
pansion had ended, the lack of markets for the
rationalized German industrial system became star-
37Angeil,op. cit., p. 183.
951tlingly clear. There was not only the burden of
excess plant capacity, in the face of heavy capital
charges, but also a pressure from labor for higher
wages. Rationalization led to the elimination of
thousands of workers, and heavy unemployment
made for growing social charges. Industries partici-
pating largely in export trade were able to sustain
their output better than those manufacturing goods
chiefly for sale in domestic markets. "It is possible
that the development in Germany from the reor-
ganization of the currency in 1924upto the end of
1927, which was characterized by rising wages and
retail prices and by a rapid rationalization and in-
crease of productive capacityin manufacturing
industries, also produced a lack of balance which
called for subsequent adjustment, although the liq-
uidation period was somewhat delayed by the good
business conditions abroad in 1928 and in the first
half of 1929." 38
3.AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
In the post-inflation period German agriculture
has faced many difficulties. Problems of production
technique and finance have been made the harder
because of the lack of fertile soils and the inertia
of habits and customs among the peasants. Within
the new boundaries created by the Treaty of Ver-
League of Nations, The Course and Phases of the World Economic
Depression (Geneva, 1931),pp.232—3.
[96sailles more land has been cultivated, yet in the
leading crops the yield per acre has generally been
less in the. post-inflation period than in the years
immediately preceding the War.8° That is,Ger-
many's agricultural productivity has declined. This
reflects not only the cultivation of inferior land, but
also the inability of agriculture to effect soil and
equipment renovations and imprbvements.
Inflation deprived the German farmers of much
of their savings and stimulated investment in unpro-
ductive tangible goods. Stabilization exposed them
to the influences of world markets, and, despite pro-
tective tariffs, the prices of German agricultural
products have tended to decline with world prices.
The competition of the dairy and vegetable prod-
ucts from Denmark and The Netherlands, which
had progressed greatly in their technique of produc-
tion and marketing during the War and post-War
years, was especially difficult to meet. The farmers
were forced to borrow in an economy that was al-
most bare of loan capital. Interest rates were exces-
sive and many loans were contracted to supply
necessary working capital and funds to pay off old
debts and taxes.4° Although there had been a "para-
See Ch. I, Part A.
"Untilthe credit collapse of July 1931mortgageloans were given
up to 40percent of the value of the farm and cost from 91/2toto
per cent. The short-term personal credits of the farmer were still
more expensive." Max Sering, in The Present Economic State of Ger-
many (study completed under the auspices of the Notgemeinschaft
der Deutschen Wissenschaft, privately printed in Germany, iggi).
97]lyzing accumulation of debt", much of it was in-
curred merely in order to keep the existing system
in operation and did not add to the effectiveness of
the latter. Furthermore, during the relatively pros-
perous post-inflation years, several crops were infe-
rior, and the larger crops from 1928to1932 were
harvested at a time of falling agricultural prices. In
this period, also, the prices of non-agricultural com-
modities were considerably more above their 1913
levelthan the prices of agricultural products, that
is, the farmers have had to pay relatively high prices
for industrial products. Thus the German farmers
have been unable to save much. Indeed, in order to
keep from sinking more deeply into debt, they have
been obliged to lower their standards of
The following table gives evidence of the price disparity under
which German agriculture is suffering:
PERCENTAGE CHANGE FROM
AVERAGE OF 1925—29 TO
FEBRUARY 1933
Prices of goods sold by farmers
Prices of agricultural products —45
Prices of goods bought by farmers
Prices of agricultural equipment
(machines, fertilizer, fuel, etc.) —20
Pricesof household furnishings —35
Prices of clothing —30
Interest rates —22
'Tariff' wages ± .0
Social insurance + 7
Despite the offsetting factors of reduced production costs and in-
creased agricultural output, the purchasing power of the agricultural
population wasmuchieduced during the period 1928—32(see Institut
für Konjunkturforschung, Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung,
Vol. 7, Nr. 4, pp. 197—203).
[98Credit difficulties have steadily increased with the
deepening depression in recent years. While they
did not materially interfere with the harvesting of
crops in 1931 and 1932, they adversely influenced
the marketing of agricultural produce. High inter-
est rates and uncertainty concerning agricultural
prices curtailed purchasing by cooperatives, middle-
men and fabricators of foodstuffs, whowere inclined
to leave the storage of crops to the producers and to
depend upon 'hand-to-mouth' buying. This added
anew to the burdens carried by agriculture and con-
tributed to further price declines.
The efforts to extend 'rationalization' into agri-
culture met with obstacles. The mechanization of
production made some progress, but it is difficult to
apply to German cultivation, much of which is
small-scale, mixed and devoted to root crops. "The
commercial side is also bad. In the main the prevail-
ing methods of selling the crops and getting them to
market are costly and inefficient, and the bookkeep-
ing practices are antiquated." 42Theconservatism
of the small farmers, who constitute the majority of
the agricultural population, hasalso obstructed
greater reorganization. Although agricultural tech-
nique and marketing methods haveimproved
within recent years, much opportunity for further
cost reduction still
The Govçrnment has made extensive attempts to
relieve agriculture. It has imposed tariffs for the
42Angell,op. cit., Pp.251—2.
99]benefitof German producers,has made large
amounts of credits available to farmers and has
exerted pressure to reduce interest rates on agricul-
tural loans. However, this relief has been effected at
a high cost to the economy as a whole.
Angel!, writing in 1928,summarizedthe conse-
quences of the agricultural difficulties as follows:
"The failure to increase agricultural production
means that food prices are relatively high, while at
the same time Germany must continue to buy an
important part of her foodstuffs in other countries.
Nearly all of these commodities come in over
heavy protective duties...andin most cases the
resulting increase in import prices is also reflected
in domestic prices. Agriculture is thereby helped
somewhat, but at a heavy cost to industry and com-
merce. The high price of foods in turn raises the
cost of living of the working classes, and this entails
higher money wages. Industrial costs of production
are forced up to correspond, and the exporting
power of the industries themselves is thus restricted,
which is particularly undesirable in the present gen-
eral situation of the country. Removal of the agri-
cultural tariff would help the domestic price situa-
tion, but the current depression in agriculture itself
would then be seriously aggravated. At the same
time imports from abroad would be increased, and
a further burden would then be placed on the al-
ready strained international financial position."
43ibid., 252—3.
{iooThe very length and depth of the recession and
depression in German industry during the years
1928—32greatlyincreased the agricultural difficul-
ties. In periods of less severe industrial depression
the consumption of domestic farm products by the
non-agricultural population was not seriously re-
stricted. Purchases of industrial products and of im-
ported foodstuffs tended to be reduced before those
of domestic foodstuffs. This, for instance, was true
of the depression in 1926.Butafter 1928,withthe
continual decline in German purchasing power, the
imports of agricultural products steadily decreased.
This meant that fluctuations in the demand for
foodstuffs must be more and more fully reflected in
German agriculture. The sharp decline of consump-
tion during 1931and1932thereforeledto especially
drastic reductions in the prices of agricultural prod-
ucts. The consequent reduction of farmers' purchas-
ing power was, in turn, an important factor in
industrial depression. Thus, difficulties peculiar to
industry and to agriculture in their interaction were
heavily depressive influences on the economy.
4. THE PRICE SYSTEM
There is evidence that the system of prices in
Germany during thepost-inflation period—espe-
cially as reflected in commodity prices, wages and
stock prices—has been characterized by much the
same cyclical pattern as have other aspects of the
ioi]economy.. This pattern has been evident not only in
prices subject to the influence of competing market
factors but also in those subject to regulation by
public and private organizations—namely, in the
prices of certain industrial commodities and in
wages.
Regulation of prices, particularly by industrial
associations, is far-flung and includes such impor-
tant commodities as coal, iron and steel products,
phosphates, chemicals, paper, glass, cement, porce-
lain and electrical equipment. The extent to which
price fluctuations are checked by the process of
price fixing is difficult to judge. It has been esti-
mated that in recent years regulation has applied to
at least fifty per cent of the commodity price system
and to ninety per cent of the wage system.44 This
rigidity is lessened by the widespread practice of
grantingrebates.Relatively highsensitivityto
changes in general business conditions and absence
of monopolistic fixation are manifest in the prices
of agricultural commodities, textiles, hides and im-
ported goods.
The movements of the general index of whole-
sale pricesfrom the beginning of 1924 to the end
"Ernst Wagemann, Einfuhrung in die Konjunkturlehre (Queue &
Meyer, Leipzig, 1929),p.63.
The general index(prepared by the Statistisches Reichsamt)isa
weighted arithmetic mean of re'ative prices on the base, 100.
Itincludes about 8oo price quotations relating to some 400agricul-
tural commodities, i uclustrial raw materials and finished products (see
Chart i).
[102of 1929werewithin rather narrow limits. During
most of this period its fluctuations were between
132 and per cent of the 1913 average. This was
largely a manifestation of the relative stability, of
raw materials and of semi-finished goods, which are
subject to considerable regulation. However, the
indexes for the prices of agricultural products and
finished goods show relatively wide fluctuations.48
Despite these differences in amplitude, thereis
similarity in the cyclical movementthe com-
modity price groups during the period 1924—29.
Afterthe beginning of 1930 all price indexes show
accelerating decline of wide amplitude.47
In general, commodity prices sank during the pe-
riod of depression and uncertainty of the first half
of 1924, but rose towards the end of that year and
during most of 1925. A downward movement set in
again late in 1925 and early in 1926butsoon gave
way to another rise, beginning, in the case of agri-
cultural products, in the spring of 1926,andin the
case of raw materials and manufactured goods, in
the spring of 1927. The advance was continued, or
a relatively stable level was maintained, until late
in 1928 ,and eór.ly in .1929, when a 'long downward
sweep began. The decline was especially steep in the
latter half of i931,:the general index fell approxi-
Compared with the price relationship of 1913,agriculturalprices
since the stabilizatio.n have been continuously at a disparity with the
prices of commodities. This has made for a shift in
the distribution of national income, to the disadvantage of agriculture.
See Chart t.mately 40 per cent from March 1929 to January
1932, nearly 12 per cent of this fall occurring dur-
ing the last six months of Commodityprices
continued to fall during 1932, although more grad-
ually, and attained a fairly stable level early in 1933.
Marked severity of decline is apparent in the prices
of agricultural products and raw materials; during
the later period of depression, however, 'regulated'
prices also dropped sharply.
The fluctuationsof'tariff'wages 48—the only
available quotations indicative of the prices of labor
services—display a similar pattern. In 1924 and 1925
regulated wage rates advanced rapidly. After a pe-
riod of relative stability in 1926 (when the business
recession reflected itself in a cessation of advance in
wages rather than in absolute decline), another rise
began, which continued until about the end of
1929.Forabout a year thereafter wages changed lit-
tle, but in 1931 a sharp drop occurred, followed by
a continuous gradual decline in 1932.
Comparison of the cyclical amplitudes of individ-
ual prices and price groups subject to regulation
with those of 'free' prices and price groups shows
that the movements of the former were quite stable..
during the yearsi 924—30 whereas the' latter fluc-
tuated violently. In fact, there is evidence that the
"Wage rates in Germany are governed in large part by a comp1ex
network of legally binding agreements, usually territorial within each
industry, which are made between the unions on the one side and
the employers, or more commonly the employers' associations, on the
other." Angel!, The Recovery of Germany, p. 273.
[104cyclical swings of unregulated prices were more pro-
nounced than before the War.49 It would seem quite
possible, as has been suggested, that regulation of
particular commodity prices and of wages may have
led to an aggravation of the cyclical movements .in
non-regulated prices and in physical quantities,
such as employment.50 However, such influence as
price regulation may have exerted until 1930 was
largely diminished in later years, particularly after
the middle of 1931,whenthe overwhelming force
of world depression made itself felt in abrupt de-
clines in all commodity prices and in wages.
5.EMPLOYMENT
Mature capitalistic countries have long suffered
from cyclical fluctuations in employment. The in-
crease in unemployment is one of the most serious
consequences of business depression in general, and
stress is often laid upon the need for 'stabilization'
as a means of allaying this disturbance of economic
life.
In Germany since1924,however, the black
shadow of a vast army of jobless people has dark-
ened not only the periods of general depression but
also periods that might otherwise be called 'pros-
perous'. Between 1924 and 1928 German economy
no doubt effected a substantial recovery, measured
SeeCh. III, Sec.d.
See Ernst Wagemann, Einfuhrung in die Konjunkturlehre, pp.
:105]in terms of production and trade, from the difficul-
ties accompanying inflation. But a national econ-
omy that year after year was incapable of assuring
all that full employment means to each of its will-
ing workers should not have been sweepingly char-
acterized as 'rehabilitated'.
During most of the inflation period unemploy-
ment was relatively slight. Only during 1923 did it
assume really severe proportions. By the beginning
of the post-stabilization period—that is, the winter
of 1923—24—about one-fourth of all trade union
members were without work. In the succeeding
years, 1924—32, unemployment figures almost always
indicate highly unfavorable conditions in the labor
market.5' This was especially pronounced during
the winter months—labor was very sensitive to sea-
sonal influences. During the one hundred and nine
months from April 1924 to April 1933 the total
reported number of unemployed workers fell below
500,000 in only four months, fluctuating between
500,000 andi,00o,ooointwenty months,be-
tween 1,000,000 and 3,000,000 during forty-nine
months, and rising to between 3,ooo,ooo and 6,200,-
ooo during anOther thirty-six months.52
51SeeChart i.
52 Thesefigures represent Only the extent of unemployment as an-
nounced by the labor exchanges. During the recession and depression
of 1928—32,however,the incentive for jobless workers to report to the
exchanges was much reduced. This was a consequence of the grow-
ing restrictions on unemployment benefits and of the declining prob-
ability of securing employment through the governmental agencies
There was, then, a steady increase in the number of unemployed not
[ro6The labor market was, indeed, sensitive to cyclical
fluctuations. The periods of industrial revival and
high business activity—that is, 1924—25 and 1927—
2 8—were characterized by steady increases in em-
ployment. Like0wisein recession and depression
periods, particularly in that of 1928—32, employ-
ment fell to very low levels. The amplitudes of these
cyclical fluctuations were very wide.
But, as indicated above, a wide underlying stra-
tum of unemployment was chronic throughout the
years 1924—33, even during the periods of relative
prosperity. The trend of industrial production was
definitely upward from 1924 to 1928, but the trend
of unemployment did not decline. Rather, it ap-
pears to have risen too. This may be attributed
partly to the production of more goods with fewer
workers than formerly.
The steps taken by German industry soon after
the currency stabilization for the purpose of reduc-
ing costs of operation included a considerable re-
duction of working staffs. According to estimates
made by the Statistisches Reichsamt, at least two
million workers were set free by this 'rationaliza-
tion' movement alone between 1925 and
Improvement in industrial technique and organiza-
tion has often led to a rise in unemployment, but
included in the official statistics. The Institut für Konjunhturfor-
schung estimated that such 'invisibleunemployment comprised ap-
proximately 1,500,000personsin the middle of 1932.
Quotedin Wirtschaftslage, Kapitalbildung, Finanzen(Ailgemeiner
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Berlin, 1930),p.io.
107]therationalizationeffectedsothoroughly and
quickly after stabilization overloaded the labor mar-
ket to an extraordinary degree.
However, factors other than the rationalization of
industry also made for chronic u,nemployment in
the post-inflation period. Large numbers of young
men and women, born before the War at a time of
an especially high birth-rate, came to maturity dur-
ing the years i 924—31 and so were added to those
seeking work. Furthermore, the War and the infla-
tion led to increases in the industrial working popu-
lation from such unusual causes as immigration
from the ceded German territories, the reduction of
the army and navy, the impoverishment of many
persons who had formerly lived on pensions and
interest incomes. Calculations of the Institut für
Konjunkturforschung indicate that the number of
persons eligible for gainful employment during the
years 1926—30, in thousands, was as follows:
BEGINNINGOF TOTALOVER i8 C8ANGE DURING






Thus, from the end of 1925 to the beginning of
1930 the working population increased nearly two
million. If the estimate that the process of rational-
Quoted in the Report of the Agent General for Reparation Payments,
May 21,1930, p.297.
[io8ization added two million to the total of unemployed
is accepted, it is apparent that it was desirable dur-
ing this period to provide employment for roughly
four million workers. A comparison of the unem-
ployment figures for 1925 and 1929 would indicate
that most of these workers did find employment.
That is, the growing productivity of Germany ac-
tually prevented unemployment from rising to even
higher levels.
Furthermore, it is believed that the years 1933—
36 will be characterized by an absolute reduction in
the number of those seeking employment. The In-
stitut für Konjunkturforschung has estimated that
during those four years the year-to-year increase in
working population will give way to decrease—a re-
flection of the low birth-rate during the World War.
This should for a time tend to reduce unemploy-
ment. However, the ability of the economy to ab-
sorb the nation's labor power will determine the
actual level of unemployment.
ESTIMATE OF FUTURE WORKING POPULATION1 (in thousands)
BEGINNING OF TOTAL OVER i8 CHANGE DURING











109]Thus, the acute problem of unemployment in
Germany during the years 1924—33wasmore than
a reflection of sharp cyclical fluctuations. The cyc-
lical movements of unemployment were superim-
posed upon a deep stratum of unemployment that
was present throughout this period. The basically
high level of unemployment seems to have been
largely the result of structural changes, particularly
in population and in industrial technique and or-
ganization. However, it is likely that these 'struc-
tural factors' will become less important in the
decade 1930—40.
6.FOREIGN TRADE AND THE BALANCE
OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS
During the seven years, 1924—30inclusive,Ger-
many's foreign indebtedness grew to something
over 28 milliard Reichsmarks. German investments
abroad amounted to 9.7 milliard. The net inflow of
capital therefore was approximately 18milliard
Reichsmarks. At the same time, German economy
received 4 milliard for services,shipping,etc.;
paid interest of 2.5milliardupon its commercial
debts; increased its holdings of gold and foreign ex-
change by 2.1milliard;made reparation payments
to the extent of 10.3milliard,and paid for a surplus
of imports over exports amounting to 6.3 milliard.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.imports in Germany's international balance of pay-
ments. During the period of large net capital im-
ports, that is, from the beginning of 1924 to the end
of 1929, the commodity import balance was on the
whole very large. Only in the early part of 1926—
a time of depression—and in the last months of 1929
was there an export surplus. From 1930 to 1933 an
export balance was persistent.
Before the War, when the international financial
position of Germany was strong, its foreign trade
was characterized by an import surplus. In the pe-
riod 1908—13 this amounted to an annual average
of about 1,400 million marks. Its surplus income
from foreign investments and services enabled it
not only to pay for a surplus of imports over exports
but also to invest more funds abroad. However, in
the post-inflation years of recovery (when the in-
come from foreign investments was practically gone)
a large inflow of foreign loans balanced the trade
deficit and reparation payments.
The fluctuations in the volume of commodities
imported, especially raw materials, reflected quite
closely the changes in general internal economic
conditions. This relationship between imports and
domestic economy is to be explained largely by the
dependence of German industry upon foreign
sources for essential raw materials.
Fluctuations in exports must be explained on a
different basis. The sudden rise in exports during
the depression of early 1926 undoubtedly reflected
[112a certain amount of necessitous selling and proved
to be merely a temporary exaggeration of the grad-
ual tendency of exports to increase. That exports
showed no tendency to decline at this time is also
an indication of the essentially local nature of the
German recession and depression of 1925—26. From
that time until the autumn of 1927,Germanecon-
omy was passing from depression to great business
activity, and a quickened domestic market gave
German merchants little incentive to seek out new
foreign markets. From the later months of 1927
untilthe autumn of 1929 exports expanded quite
continuously. The diminution of business at home,
together with the greater exporting capacity derived
from large production, encouraged the development
of export trade. Such an expansion was made pos-
sible by the increased power of foreign markets to
buy—reflection of the economic activity prevailing
in many countries. In the years 1930—32, with the
advent of world-wide depression, export oppOrtuni-
ties became fewer, and German sales abroad de-
clined. Resistance to German goods in world mar-
kets became increasingly pronounced during
andearly 1933,largelyas a result of rising trade bar-
riers and increasing competition from countries
with depreciated currencies. However, owing to a
combination of circumstances peculiar to the de-
pression, Germany's surplus of exports over imports
was large during 1930—32. Prices of raw materials
in world markets fell relatively more than prices of
113]finished goods. This price differential was of great
advantage to German exporting manufacturers, who
doubtless made strenuous efforts to maintain their.
sales in foreign markets. Furthermore, the severity
of the depression in Germany drastically
the demand for goods from abroad. The surplus in
the three years 1930—32 from commodity exports
and services to foreigners, estimated to total nearly
6.7 milliard Reichsmarks, was thus largely a concom-
itant of depressive circumstances.
[ii4